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Since 1990, the United Nations Development Program has published an annual Human 
Development Report (HDR) in an effort to chart the progress of  broad indicators of  well-being 
around the world.  In contrast to a focus on income as the sole measure of  economic progress, 
these reports have also emphasized the importance of  other indicators of  well-being that are often 
not closely related to income, such as life expectancy and education.  Following work by Sen 
(1985,1992) and others (Stewart 1985, Streeten et al.  1981, Morris 1979), the reports have argued 
that these non-income measures of  well-being should be an integral component of  any assessment 
of  well-being as they measure important aspects of  well-being directly, while income is only one 
among several inputs to generating such well-being. 
While the particular index developed for the assessment, the Human Development Index 
(HOI), has been criticized for some of its choices of  components, weights, and aggregation rules 
(Ravalli  on, 1996; Kelley, 1991; Srinivasan, 1994a), the disparity between the HOI and income 
measures of  progress in many countries has powerfully demonstrated that income may be a poor 
indicator of  well-being in some contexts.  As such, it has furthered debates about the importance 
of  non-income goals such as health and education in many countries.  In addition, the Reports 
helped develop and compile new information about a broad range of  measures of well-being and 
deprivation for many countries, although the reliability and compatibility of some ofthe 
information presented is open to question (Srinivasan 1994b). 
In the 1995 Human Development Report (HDR) focusing on gender, UNDP presented two 
new indicators of well-being, the Gender-Related Development Index (GOI) and the Gender 
Empowerment Measure (GEM).  While the GEM charts the progress in women's agency in 
economic and public life, the GOI is not a measure of women's achievements as such, but 
includes gender inequality in its overall assessment of  well-being in a country.  The GOI thus 
suggests, appropriately, that gender inequality is not only a problem for those it disfavors, but it 
detracts from overall development in a country. 
The two new measures constitute a potentially important tool for analyzing gender 
inequality and its impact on overall development.  In view of  major gender inequalities in 
education, health, economic opportunities, and life prospects prevailing in many countries, the 
importance of  measuring these and their impacts, their change over time and differences across 
regions, is self-evident.  To the extent that these measures would be taken up by policy-makers in 
individual countries as indicators of  progress, they could help focus policy debates on gender 2 
inequality, its causes and its consequences. 
While they are thus important new ways to conceptualize gender inequality and compare 
the progress of  nations in this respect, we argue that the particular ways the indices were 
constructed and the assumptions made to overcome data gaps severely limit their usefulness and 
produce a number of  problematic results.  In particular, we argue that the GDI is dominated by a 
conceptually and empirically problematic estimate of  gender gaps in eamed income, while 
downplaying the role of  the gaps in education and largely ignoring those in mortality, arguably 
the two most important problems confronting women in many developing countries.  We also 
suggest that the GEM is too heavily focused on representation at the national political level and in 
the fomlal economy.  Where appropriate, we will propose remedies for the shortcomings 
identified to improve this potentially important tool. 
The next section describes the underlying theory and the way the GDI is constructed. In 
the section following, we focus on the GDI, highlighting problems with its design as well as the 
assumptions used to fill in for missing data. Section four critically reviews the GEM, and section 
five draws conclusions. 
2. Theory and Derivation ofthe GDI 
The theoretical underpinning for the ODI is provided by Anand and Sen (1995a) in a 
teclmical note appended to the Human Development Report and, in an expanded version, in a 
background paper to the report (Anand and Sen 1995b).  In the note, Anand and Sen treat gender 
inequality as one of several possible inter-group inequalities, and then base their analysis on the 
assumption common in economics that individuals and societies have, ceteris paribus, an 
aversion to inequality.  If  two societies had the same average achievement but different levels of 
inter-group inequality in that achievement, aversion to inequality would mean that the society 
with the lower inter-groups inequality should be socially preferable to one having the same 
average achievement but larger inequality.! 
lOne way to conceptualize this point is to decompose a gender gap in achievement (e.g. in literacy) into a mean for 
both groups (e.g. average literacy of  40%) and a 'mean-preserving regressive transfer' from the disfavored to the 
favored group (say, females 'transfer' 5 percentage points of their literacy to males, leaving them with 35% literacy 
and males with 45%).  Using the latter concept, one can easily see that a society preferring more equality to less 
(holding the mean constant) would prefer a situation where both genders had the same achievement to one where the 
mean achievement was the same but a gender gap existed.  This assumption of mean-preserving inequality aversion 
is not peculiar to specific social welfare functions, but commonly used in welfare economics.  For a theoretical 
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Based on this notion of  aversion to inter-group inequality, the OD! then simply becomes a 
special case of  the more commonly known HDI, adjusted for the gender gaps to 'penalize' 
countries for the existing inter-group inequality between males and females.  Since the HDI 
ignores inter-group differences and (implicitly) assumes that everyone in a country has reached 
the average achievement in the three components of  the index (life expectancy, education, and 
income), the adjustment for gender disparity will invariably lower the OD!, relative to the HDl.2 
The extent the OD! is lower than the HD! will depend on the size of  the gender gap in each 
component and the penalty factor applied to this gap.3 
As an adjusted version of  the HD!, the OD! too consists of  three components: longevity, 
education, and income.  Observed gender gaps in a component are considered in relation to the 
maximum possible achievement in that component.  Therefore, it is important not only to know 
the absolute size of the gap, but also the range of possible achievements which then determines 
the relative shortfall considered for the gender penalty. 
In the life expectancy component, it is assumed that, given equal treatment, women would 
outlive men by an average of  5 years.  This apparent biological advantage offemales is well 
established in the literature, although its precise magnitude is controversial (Waldron 1993; 
lohannsson 1991; Klasen 1994b).  If  the female life expectancy exceeds the male by less or more 
than 5 years, a gender gap is held to exist (e.g. if  female life expectancy is 42 and male life 
expectancy 40, then a gender gap of3 years against females is assumed to exist).  The range of 
possible life expectancies assumed in the HDR is 60 years (from 27.5 to 87.5 years for females, 
and 22.5 to 82.5 years for males), thereby implicitly assuming maximum possible gender gap of 
60 years. 
In the literacy and school enrollment component of  the index,4 women and men are 
assumed to have the same potential achievement (100% literacy and school enrollment) so that 
discussion of  this notion, see Atkinson (1970).  For economic, philosophical, and ethical justifications of  aversion to 
inequality, see Klasen (1994a). 
2 In a country with no gender gap in the components included in the IIDI, the GD! would, of  course, equal the lID!. 
3 It is important to point out that this method of  adjusting the IIDI downward to reflect inter-group inequalities need 
not be confined to gender.  It would perfectly be possible to apply this method to other inter-group differences such 
as racial, ethnic, or class gaps within a country.  Given the magnitude of  these gaps in some countries, such 
adjustments could yield important results in many cases. 
4 The education component of  the GOI and HOI consist of  two elements.  Literacy which receives a weight of2/3, 
and combined primary, secondary, and tertiary enrollment which receives a weight of 113. 
3 any difference in literacy rates or school enrollment rates constitute a gap, with a maximwn 
possible gap of 100%. 
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In the income component of  the index, a gap is held to exist if  the estimated shares of  the 
earned income between males and females differ from their population share (which in most 
countries is close to 50%).  The penalty for the gender gap is applied to the female and male 
proportional income shares, which are defined as the shares of  income earned by females (males) 
divided by their population share (e.g. iffemales earn 20% of  income and are 50% of  the 
population, their proportional income share is 0.4, while the corresponding share for males will be 
1.6 ((1-80%)/50%).  Thus the maximum gap in proportional income shares is 2 (in the case where 
either females or males earn 100% of  income). 
Apart from the magnitude of  the gender gap, the extent of  the penalty applied to this gap 
determines the amount by which a country's GDI is smaller than the HDI.  The way this is done 
in the GDI calculation is to construct the so-called 'equally distributed equivalent achievement' 
(edea) which is "defined to be the level of  achievement that, if  attained equally by women and 
men, would be judged to be exactly as valuable socially as the actually observed achievement" 
(Anand and Sen 1995a: 126).  For example, what would be the level ofliteracy that, if  achieved 
equally by everyone, would yield the same social valuation as the actual achievement that shows 
the gender gap of, say, 45% for males and 38% for females. The formula for calculating the 
equally distributed equivalent achievement (edea) crucially depends on the size of  the exponent E, 
the aversion to inequality factor.5  A larger E implies a greater penalty for gender gaps.  If  E were 
zero, there would be no penalty for inequality and the equally distributed equivalent would simply 
be the weighted mean of  the male and female levels (weighted by the popUlation shares which in 
most countries is close to half).  Any E greater than 0 leads to the edea to be below the weighted 
mean.  For the UNDP report, a level of  £=2 was chosen to be applied.  As a result, "the 
incremental achievement of  women has four times the weight of  men's if  the ratio of  male and 
5 The fonnula for the equally distributed equivalent achievement, applied to the education index is as follows: 
edea = [male/pop*(edilcml'"'+female/pop*(educm ) "'l"('~) 
where: 
male/pop, female/pop: male and female population shares 
educm eduer: index of educational achievement for males and females (ranging from 0 10 1) 
E:  aversion to inequality factor 
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female achievement is 2" (UNDP 1995: 74).6  Clearly, the size of  £ is, to a certain extent, 
arbitrary, but the penalty imposed by £=2 appears to be within the range of  reasonable choices. 
In the earned income component, an additional transformation drastically alters the gender 
penalty for unequal income shares.  After the calculation of  the equally distributed equivalent 
achievement, the gender penalty is then mUltiplied by the adjusted average income (which, itself 
is a concave transformation mapping actual PPP-adjusted income per capita into a range from 
$100 to $5448) and then the index is derived by determining how much a country falls short of 
the maximum potential adjusted income of$5448.  An implication of  this calculation is that the 
penalty for unequal income shares is dependent not only on the magnitude of  the gender gap in 
earned income, but aiso on the income level.  An identical gender gap in income shares (e.g. 
women earning 20% and men 80% of  earned income) will yield more than 4 times the gender 
penalty in a rich country such as Saudi Arabia (with adjusted per capita income of  over $5200) 
than in a poor country like Bangladesh (with an adjusted per capita income of  only $1200).  No 
justification for this different treatment of  gender inequality in earned income between poor and 
rich countries is provided. 
The gender penalties thus calculated are then applied to the HDI, which combines with 
equal weight the three components -- life expectancy, education, and  income -- to arrive at the 
gender-sensitive index ODI.7 
As the ODI is simply the HDI adjusted to take into account gender differences, it is 
possible to investigate how large the imposed penalty for gender inequality is in each country 
(by simply subtracting the ODI from the HDI) and which component accounts for most of  this 
penalty for gender inequality.  In Table I below, we selected a sample of  35 countries (from 
the 130 for which UNDP cruculated the ODI in 1995) to illustrate the magnitude and source of 
the gender inequality penalties implicit in the ODI.8 
6 For example, if  male literacy is 30% and female  \5%, then the laner receives four times the weight as the former 
thereby pushing the valuation below the simple average (from the average of22.5% to the edea of  only 20%, leading 
to a gender penalty of2.5%). 
7 The method of  calculating the GDl proposed by the UNDP uses a different route and does not separate out the 
penalty component associated with gender inequality explicitly, but a simple transformation could easily achieve 
this.  We will not review the way the HDl is constructed here (see, for example, RavaIlion (1996». 
8 The sample was chosen to include all of  the world's most populous countries for which data was available (e.g. 
Germany is excluded since it not listed in the UNDP report) and to include several countries from all major regions 
of the world. 
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As expected, no country has a GDI as high as its HDI, suggesting that all countries 
have some gender gaps in at least one of  their components.  The average penalty for gender 
inequality implicit in the GDI is 0.059, so that the HDI is reduced by an average of  9% as a 
result of gender inequality.  It  differs dramatically between countries and regions. In Sweden, 
the GDI is only 1  % smaller than the lIDI, suggesting the smallest gender gap.  By far the 
largest gender inequality penalties are found in the countries of  the Middle East and North 
Africa, where the GDI is up to 33% lower than the HOI.  In contrast, the countries of  South 
and East Asia have comparatively smaller gender penalties.  Countries in South-East Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa have very small penalties for gender inequality comparable to those found 
in OEeD countries.  Also noticeable are the very small gender inequality penalties in Eastern 
Europe and Russia, among the lowest of  the countries listed. 
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GDI  HOI  Absolute 
Penalty 
0.919  0.929  0.010 
0.901  0.927  0.026 
0.901  0.937  0.036 
0.896  0.937  0.041 
0.862  0.916  0.054 
0.851  0.936  0.085 
0.838  0.855  0.017 







0.813  0.915  0.102 
0.768  0.882  0.114 
0.744  0.792  0.048 
0.741  0.842  0.101 
0.709  0.804  0.095 
0.686  0.862  0.176 
Un. Arab Emirates 0.674  0.861  0.187 





















0.514  0.762  0.248 
0.508  0.732  0.224 
0.471  0.481  0.010 
0.453  0.613  0.160 
0.403  0.425  0.022 
0.383  0.406  0.023 
0.341  0.369  0.028 
0.332  0.379  0.047 
0.217  0.227  0.010 
0.578  0.594  0.016 
0.625  0.677  0.052 
0.591  0.637  0.046 
0.798  0.827  0.029 
0.310  0.343  0.033 
0.401  0.439  0.038 
0.334  0.364  0.030 
0.660  0.704  0.044 
0.360  0.483  0.123 
0.595  0.654  0.059 
Percent 
Penalty 
Share of Penalty Accounted by:  Absolute Gaps in Components 
Gap  in  Gap  in  Gap in  Life Exp.  Education  Income 
Life Exp ..  Education  Income  (years)  (index)  (shares) 
1.1% 
2.8% 
0.10%  0.05%  99.85%  -0.7  -0.9  16.8 
0.07%  0.02%  99.91 %  -0.9  -0.9  28.0 
3.8% 
4.4% 
0.25%  0.10%  99.65%  -1.8  -2.1  30.8 









II.J %  0.01% 
12.9%  0.12% 
6.1 %  0.05% 
12.0%  0.04% 
11.8%  0.00% 
20.4%  0.01 % 
21.7%  0.08% 
20.6%  0.34% 
32.5%  0.05% 
30.6%  0.11 % 
2.1 %  1.42% 
26.1 %  0.15% 
5.2%  2.79% 
5.7%  0.73% 




















































































































































































Source: own calculations based on UNDP (l995).  Education gaps refer to the difference in the combined index ofliteracy and enrollment for 
males and females; earned income gap refers to the difference in male and female shares of  eamed income. 
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When disaggregated into the three components, it becomes apparent that the gender 
penalty is overwhelmingly accounted for by the earned-income gap.  In most countries, the 
earned-income gap accounts for more than 90% of  the gender penalty.  Only in a few countries 
where the absolute gender penalty is fairly small, do the other two components account for a 
larger share of  the small penalty.  For all 130 countries listed in the HDR, the weighted average of 
the penalty accounted for by the earned-income component (weighted by the size of  the gender 
penalty) is 93.8%.  If  the penalty of  the earned income component were excluded, 62 countries 
would have a GDi ranking of  at least five places higher or lower than they do with the earnings 
component included, illustrating the magnitude of  this component's impact on the GDi ranking. 
In contrast, ,he life expectancy component accounts for a negligible amount of  the gender 
gap.  In no country does it account for more than 6% of the penalty, and the weighted average is a 
paltry 0.4%.  None of  the GDi rankings change as a result of  this component of  the indicator.9 
The education gap accounts for a considerable share of  the penalty in some countries, including 
those countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that have a small overall penalty, low incomes, and a 
comparatively small earned income gap.IO  The weighted average, however, only amount to less 
than 6% of  the total penalty.  Only eight countries would have a different GDi ranking if  the 
gender penalty of  the education component was excluded; none would change their ranking by 
more than 5 places.  Thus the education component also has a rather modest impact on the gender 
penalty imposed by the GDI. 
What accounts for the overriding impact of  the earned income component?  First, the 
measured gap relative to the maximum possible gap is much larger in the earned income 
component than in the life expectancy and education components.  The gaps in life expectancy 
vary within a range from -7 to +6 out of  a possible range of  60 years, none exceeding 11 % of  the 
total possible gap.  In the education index, the gap ranges from -3 to +23, equivalent to 23% of 
the maximum possible gap.  In the earned income component, the gap ranges from + 16 to +90 in 
the shares of  earned income, and from 0.3 to 1.8 (out of  a range of  2) in the proportional income 
shares.  Thus even the smallest gap in earned income in any country (in Sweden) constitutes 
9 In come cases where Ihe GD! (including the life expectancy component) is identical between countries (at the level 
offour significant figures), the exclusion of  the life expectancy gap may change the ranking in some of  these 
countries. 
10 As mentioned earlier, low incomes reduce the weight attached to the earned income gap, thereby increasing the 
relative weight of  the other three gaps. 
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already 15% of  the maximum possible gap in earned income, which is already higher than the 
largest observed gap in longevity anywhere and larger than most education gaps.  The highest 
earned income gap stands at 90% of  the maximum possible gap, several times larger than the 
largest gaps in the other components. 
Since the same aversion to inequality factor E is applied to all three indices, larger 
observed gaps (relative to the potential maximum gap) receive larger penalties, and thus the 
earned income gaps, ranging 15-90% of  the potential maximum gap, dominate all the other gaps 
in most countries when the inequality penalties are applied to these gaps.  Whether the impression 
created by the GDl, that the earned income gaps are the only substantive gender gaps in the 
world, and that the gaps in longevity and education are trivial by comparison, is highly debatable 
and will be taken up in greater detail below. 
This overriding effect of  the earned-income component also accounts for the very high 
penalty imposed on the Middle Eastern and North African countries (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Algeria, 
Egypt, Bahrain) as these have the largest gaps in earned incomes.  Due to the sheer size of  the 
earned-income gaps and the resulting large penalties, the fact that these countries have 
comparatively small gaps in longevity and education does not count for much to modify this 
impression. I I 
Moreover, the different treatment of  gaps in earned income in poor and rich countries 
compounds the large penalties in the Middle East and North Africa and serves to reduce the 
observed penalty in South Asia.  In the world of  the GDi calculation, the Middle Eastern 
countries suffer from the unfortunate combination of  a large earned income gap and fairly large 
incomes which, as discussed above, further amplify the gender penalty in the GDI.  The 
difference between Bahrain and Pakistan is instructive here: the same earned-income gap leads to 
a 50% higher overall gender penalty in Bahrain's GDI than in Pakistan's despite much lower gaps 
in education and life expectancy (Table 1).  The high penalty for earned income gaps in high 
income countries also explains the very high penalties imposed on countries such as Ireland, 
Argentina, and Mexico.'2 
II Similarly, the comparatively small gaps in earned income in the fonner communist countries of  Eastern Europe 
account for their very small penalties. 
12 Conversely, relatively low penalties are attached to earned income gaps in low-income Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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The aim and underlying premise of  the GDI (to see gender inequality as a human 
development issue not primarily a 'women's issue') is to be welcomed, and the way to adjust the 
HDI by the gender gaps in its components is an appropriate theoretical procedure.  Moreover, one 
hopes that the development of  the GDI will focus policy discussions on gender inequality and 
further the collection of  gender-disaggregated data for analysis and policy. 
At the same time, it appears that, in practice, the GDI is almost entirely driven by gaps 
in earned income and thereby implicitly downplays the importance of  gender gaps in 
longevity and education.  Also, the method of  calculating the earned-income gap imposes a 
very large penalty on wealthy countries with large gaps in earned income, without providing 
any justification for it.  The following section examines the theoretical and empirical 
underpinnings of  the components of  the GDI in more detail. 
3. The Components ofthe GDI 
As seen in Table I, the longevity component plays a minor role in the GDI.  Part of  the 
reason for that is the comparatively small gaps in longevity observed.  Does this mean that gender 
gaps in longevity are not an important issue? 
Another statistic, also first developed by Amartya Sen, to measure the impact of 
gender bias in life prospects, is the concept of 'missing women' which refers to the 
cumulative number of  women that have died as a result of  gender bias in mortality (Sen 1989, 
Dreze and Sen 1995; Klasen 1994b).  Table 2 shows the number and percent of 'missing 
women' in regions of  the developing world. 
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Table 2' Sex Ratios and Missing Women in the World 
Actual  Expected  Number of  Percentage  Number 
Sex Ratio  Sex Ratio  Women  "Missing"  "Missing" (M.) 
China  1.066  0.977  548.7  6.91  37.9 
India  1.077  0.992  406.3  8.53  34.7 
Bangladesh  1.064  0.961  40.0  9.44  3.8 
Pakistan  1.105  1.010  422  10.72  4.5 
Nepal  1.050  0.968  7.3  8.46  0.6 
Pacific Islands  1.067  0.980  3.1  8.50  0.3 
Transition Economies  0.975 
South-East Asia  1.001 
East Asia  1.029  0.990  36.7  4.31  1.6 
South-West Asia  1.047  1.0]5  55.0  4.40  2.4 
North Africa  1.026  0.996  77.5  3.03  2.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.980  0.957  253.0  2.37  6.1 
Latin America and Caribbean  0.993 
Europe and North America  0.946 
.. 
Note:  OfilClal data for  1991  (India),  1990 (China),  1985 (West Asia),  1981 (Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal).  For all other regions, data are 
estimates for 1995.  Only where there  are instances of  excess female mortality, the number of  missing women is calculated. 
Sources: United Nations (1979,1991), Coale (1991), Sen (1989), Klasen (1994b), Bos et a!. (1994). 
The picture in Table 2 is drastically different from that in Table 1 in several ways.  First, 
the numbers in Table 2 suggest that gender bias in mortality is a major problem in several regions 
of  the developing world.  With nearly 100 million 'missing women', it appears to be one of  the 
most important aspects of gender bias in the developing world which is very different from the 
impression generated by the GDI where gender bias in mortality plays a negligible role. 
Moreover, the regional distribution of 'missing women' is quite different from that of  the gender 
gaps in life expectancy in Table 1.  In particular, the problem of  missing women appears to be 
most severe in the countries of South Asia and China, where between 6.9% and 10.8% of  women 
are 'missing'. The problem exists also in West Asia and North Africa, but is much smaller.  In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the problem as yet is small with only about 2% of  women 'missing'.13 
The column on  life expectancy gap in Table 1 also suggests that women in South Asia 
(especially Bangladesh, India, and Nepal) seem to be suffering from considerable gaps in life 
expectancy.  At the same time, and in contrast to Table 2, these gaps do not appear to be much 
13  In the countries of  East  em Europe and the former Soviet Union, where females outnumber males by a 
considerable margin, there may be a serious issue of  'missing menl,  Since a considerable portion of  this problem is 
due to the heavy male losses during World War II, it is conceptually not clear whether those should be included in an 
assessment.  At the same time, females in Russia and some Eastern European countries also currently have a large 
life expectancy advantage (mainly due to the impact of  alcohOlism, accidents, and violence among males), which is 
generating new 'missing men', in addition to those who died in World War II. 
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larger than in some other developing countries, such as Zambia or Iran, and are smaller than the 
gap in disfavor of  men in Russia.  Moreover, the observed sex-gap in life expectancy in China 
appears to be smaller than in most other developing countries (including many in Sub-Saharan 
and North Africa and West Asia), suggesting that there is comparatively little sex-bias in 
mortality in China, which is in stark contrast to Table 2. 
What accounts for this rather disparate views on the geographic distribution of  gender bias 
in mortality?  First, there may be inaccuracies in the data.  Data on life expectancy are difficult to 
estimate reliably in the absence of  complete vital registration systems since life expectancy is 
very sensitive to the often underreported number of  infant deaths.  Thus the smaller magnitude of 
the gap in life expectancy data may simply be due to imprecise data.  This may also be due to the 
fact that much of the sex-disaggregated data were estimated rather then directly measured 
(Srinivasan 1994b). 
Secondly, the life expectancy figure reports on present conditions only, while the estimate 
of  missing women, based on the population sex ratio, measures the cumulative impact of  past and 
present gender inequality.  The discrepancy between the two measured gaps might therefore 
suggest that gender bias in mortality is declining which is supported by some other evidence from 
mortality statistics in South Asia (Dreze and Sen, 1995). 
It can, however, be asked whether it may not be preferable to also consider the impact of 
past gender bias in mortality in the index as it is still being felt in these societies in very powerful 
ways.14  This could be done in much the same way the education index (discussed below) 
combines literacy which measures the impact of past and present policies, as well as school 
enrollment which measures only the impact of  present policies. 15  Similarly, the longevity index 
could include a measure of  missing women as a stock component and a measure of  the life 
expectancy gap as a flow concept.  16  This would generate a more reliable indicator, be 
14 The female deficit has a number of important demographic and social consequences in the countries with large 
shares of 'missing women'.  Moreover, it can be argued that it is ethically dubious to leave victims of discrimination 
out of consideration simply because they have died as a result of the discrimination. 
15 Literacy measures the stock of primary education, school enrollment the flow of primary, secondary, and tertiary 
education.  To match the stocks and flows, one would ideally include a stock measure that would also include 
secondary and tertiary education (such as school achievement data). 
16 Calculating the number of missing women (or missing men) would be fairly straightforward for most developing 
countries which have quasi-stationary popUlations and for which the Model Life Tables could be used to compare 
actual and expected sex ratios (adjusted for international migration, which is important in countries of the Middle 
East and North Africa).  For developed countries where fertility has fallen over the past decades and fluctuated 
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symmetrical with the treatment of  education in the index, and reflect more accurately the impact 
of  gender bias in mortality, past and present, in a society.17 
A third reason why the gender gap in life expectancy does not conform well with the 
estimates of 'missing women' is that in some countries, most notably China and South Korea, the 
incidence of  sex-selective abortions as a way to choose the sex of  children has been considerable 
(Banister and Coale: 1994).  In China, this has led to the sex-ratio at birth (the number of  males 
divided by the number offemales born) rising by more than 5 percentage points in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s with up to one million sex-selective abortions of  females per year (Banister and 
Coale, op. cit.).18  Parental attempt in China to select the sex of  their children is linked with the 
one-child policy announced in 1976 which, combined with the desire of many Chinese to have a 
male heir, has induced strategies to ensure that the one child allowed will be a boy.  Sex-selective 
abortions are not captured by the life expectancy gap since only live births are considered in the 
calculation.19  The 'missing women' calculation, however, reflects the impact of  these policies as 
it incorporates an expected (unmanipulated) sex ratio at birth in its calculation.2o 
Regardless of  one's view on abortion as a woman's choice, it appears clear that sex-
selective abortion to detennine the sex of  one's children is a fonn of  violence against females and 
its impact should clearly be considered when measuring gender bias in mortality.  Including an 
considerably (with baby booms and busts) and where the demographic impact of wars is still being felt in the older 
cohorts, this process would be more complicated as the number of 'missing women' would have to be estimated for 
each cohort and then aggregated.  Since the demographic information in these countries is of  very high quality, this 
could easily be done. 
17 There is, of  course, a distinction between the way literacy and 'missing women' are a stock concept: literacy 
measures the impact of  past and present education policies on those currently alive in a country, while the 'missing 
women' measure would include those no longer alive as a result of  discrimination.  While one may argue that this is 
an important distinction, it should also be pointed out that there is a certain degree of  injustice in excluding those that 
died as a result of  discrimination immediately from the analysis in later years, and that a society that engaged in such 
discrimination has its legacy still with them. 
18 The extent of sex-selective abortions is unknown precisely (and is illegal and therefore unreported) and has to be 
inferred indirectly.  Since part of the rise in the sex ratio at birth may be due to under-registration of females, it is 
difficult to tell how many of  the more than I million missing female infants per year are undercounted and how 
many have died as a result of  sex-selective abortions (Johannssen and Nygren, 1991). 
19 In fact, the move in China from a neglect offemale infants in the early 1980s to sex-selective abortions in the late-
1980s would lead to a narrowing of  the gender gap in life expectancy, but can hardly be seen as an accomplishment 
for gender bias in mortality. 
20 Depending on overall health conditions, the sex ratio at birth fluctuated between 1.04 and 1.07.  The 'missing 
women' calculation is based on these normal sex ratios at birth.  Sex ratios at birth that are much larger than this 
suggest a high incidence of sex-selective aboI1ions, and would therefore generate 'missing women' at birth.  For 
details, see Coale (1991) and Klasen (1994b). 
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estimate of  missing women in the estimate of  gender bias in longevity would capture this recent 
development where gender bias in mortality has shifted to sex-selective abortions.21 
Apart from questions about reliability of  data, the education component of  the ODI seems 
to be the least problematic of  the three.  The inclusion of  literacy to measure the impact of  past 
policies and enrollments to measure the impact of  current efforts appropriately suggests that both 
matters for the well-being of  a country.  The inclusion of  the gender gap in enrollments and 
achievements is straight-forward and appropriately puts heavy penalties on large gaps. 
By far the most serious conceptual and empirical problems are with the earned income 
component, which unfortunately accounts for nearly all of  the gender penalty implicit in the ODI 
calculation (Table I).  First, the link between the HDI measuring average achievements and the 
ODI adjusting this average achievement for gender gaps breaks down in the earned income 
component.  While the income component of  the HDI is a fairly reliable proxy measure of 
average consumption, the shares of  incomes earned by males and females do not measure the gaps 
in consumption between males and females at the household level.  Income, in contrast to 
education and longevity, is shared within the household, so that a low female share of  earned 
income is not necessarily highly correlated with a low female consumption share. While it is true 
that the level of  earned income brought by women to the household affects their share and control 
over the allocation of  its resources, clearly they have some access to the resources even if  they do 
not earn any income.22  Conversely, high earned income does not always translate into high 
female well-being and consumption levels.23 
21  A fourth reason for the differences between Tables 2 and I is the assumption of  a fIxed fIve-year biological 
advantage enjoyed by females everywhere.  It is more likely that the biological advantage women have is smaller in 
high mortality environments (maybe 2-3 years when overall life expectancy is at about 35), and larger in low 
mortality environments (up to 7 years).  This would then suggest that the comparatively large gender gaps in life 
expectancy found in Sub-Saharan Africa are in fact much smaller as overall mortality is very high in these countries; 
conversely, some of  the industrialized countries reporting gender gaps favoring women may actually have no bias in 
either direction.  Given the minuscule weight of  the life expectancy component in the GDI, none of  this signifIcantly 
affects the GDI ranking of  a country. 
22 A good example for a rather poor correlation between female earned income and female consumption are some 
of  the oil-rich Arab States (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE) that have low levels of  female earned income but high 
levels of  female consumption (and high female achievements in life expectancy). 
23  Under the Socialist regimes of  East  em Europe and the Soviet Union, women had very high labor-force 
participation rates and a fairly high share of  earnings.  Nevel1heless, women were regularly expected to carry a 
double burden of full-time employment and housework for which they received little assistance, and suffered from 
labor market discrimination in a variety of  fonns. During the transition, however, the rapidly rising female 
unemployment and the reduction of  women's work oppol1Unities are vety likely to have reduced their well-being in 
the process of  their decreasing control over income resources (Klasen, 1993). 
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This problem is well recognized in the HDR and in the technical note (Anand and Sen 
1995a).  The report and the technical note suggest instead that the shares of  earned income are 
a measure of  gaps in agency which is of  intrinsic significance and which is related to the 
shares of  resources males and females receive at the household level.  While this is true and, 
as we argue below, well-suited for inclusion in the Gender Empowerment Measure, it puts 
into question the conceptual underpinnings of  the GD! as it is no longer obvious what it 
means for an overall development indicator if  a proxy for average consumption is adjusted by 
gender gaps in agency.  Moreover, by using earned income gaps to adjust average incomes, 
the impression is created that gaps in  agency are as important as equivalent gaps in 
consumption, which may be debatable. 
Second, the focus on inequality in imputed earnings between males and females implicitly 
assumes that a 50150 split in income is necessarily the desirable state of  affairs, which is 
debatable.  Some may argue that a certain sexual division oflabor is economically advantageous 
and socially necessary; others may argue that this is a culturally relative goal and is based on 
Western conception of  economic and social organization. 
Third, the concept of  earned income excludes unremunerated work and reproductive 
labor, which is substantial in most parts of  the developing world. Calling for a 50150 split in 
earnings from economic activities, while continuing to exclude unremunerated labor in the 
measure, implies that unremunerated labor is and remains worthless, which is contrary to the 
spirit of  the Human Development Reports. 
In addition, there are serious questions about the particular way the earned-income share is 
calculated, including the assumptions made to arrive at the estimates.  These are calculated by 
using the ratio of  female to male non-agricultural wages (as a proxy for the female-male wage 
ratio in the total economy) to estimate the ratio offemale wages to average wages and of  male 
wages to average wages.  These are then multiplied by the female and male shares of  the 
economically active popUlation (the labor force) to obtain the male and female shares of  earned 
income.  If  these shares differ from the respective population shares, the penalty for aversion to 
inequality is imposed (UNDP 1995: 130-2). 
The use of  the non-agricultural wage-ratio with the labor-force participation data to derive 
the female and male shares of  total earnings (from all economic activities, paid or not) is 
questionable for three reasons. 
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First, take the assumption of  the average female-to-male wage in non-agricultural sectors 
to be the average wage-ratio for the agricultural sector as well, and the use of  this ratio as a proxy 
for overall wage-differential by sex.  Using this proxy implies a great deal of  intersectoral 
mobility of  labor, both male and female, which is hardly reconcilable with the evidence oflabor-
market rigidities of  varying degrees among regions and sectors and skill-levels within most 
developing countries.  The female-male wages in the formal non-agricultural sectors do not as a 
rule represent those in agriculture and other informal sectors, certainly not to the same extent 
between countries like Thailand or South Korea with about 40% of  paid non-agricultural 
employment being female and India with only about 12%.  In addition, in many Sub-Saharan 
African countries, the female share of  employment in the formal sectors is so low that it seems 
quite impossible to use them to represent the entire female labor force. 
Secondly, the difference between women's share of  self-employment and family-
employment in agriculture and other informal sectors and their share of  non-agricultural wage-
workers varies far more among countries than does the corresponding difference in the case of 
men. For women, this difference tends to be larger in the poorer countries with large proportions 
of  peasants and artisans and non-market sectors in the workforce.  To assume the wage-gap by 
sex in factories and companies to be similar to the remuneration-gap for work in family 
production and petty trading would imply that those working on own account or as helpers in 
family business could otherwise all -- and more or less equally too by sex --be in jobs at the 
prevailing non-agricultural wage rates.  This is not the case in low-income agricultural countries 
with mobility in credit and labor markets variously constrained for women relative to men.  Even 
if  the comparison of  wage-gaps were to be limited only to the low-income countries, the 
assumption of  a uniform wage-gap would not hold beyond the educated young for whom work 
increasingly means wage work in or near cities.24  The wage-gap even for casual farm labor, in 
Incidentally, the question of sharing within the household presents problems unique to a gender-sensitive 
indicator.  If  one chose to include other inter-group inequalities in the assessment of  human development in a 
country, it would be a much less severe problem as the majority of  members of  groups classified by race, ethnicity 
or class, do not mix systematically at the household level, and therefore estimates of  their earnings would be a 
reasonably good proxy for their consumption. 
24 The estimation of  the earnings-gap component of  the GDI could well be used for comparisons where female 
wage-labor is more substantial and uniform. To compare, for example, the educated urban young cohorts in Asia. 
Averaged for age-groups, it could perhaps even be used for comparing between Asian cities -- between, say, 
Singapore, Bombay, Colombo, Bangkok. But hardly for comparing between Singapore, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand. 
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India for exarnple, is found to vary between high-growth and low-growth regions and between 
peak and slack seasons. 
Thirdly, for the majority of  the GDI-ranked nations, the earned-income component 
actually is not based on estimation of  the non-agricultural wage ratio by sex.  In seventy-four 
countries, including the vast majority of  the developing countries, for which a sex-breakdown of 
the wage data is not available from the ILO sources, an average female-male wage ratio of  75%, 
derived from the remaining 56 countries, is applied instead of  a direct estimate from actual 
figures.  The degree of  uniformity thus introduced in the wage-ratio across countries at various 
levels of  development and employment structure means that the wide variations in the female 
share of  the labor force dominate the inter-country picture regarding gender disparity in earnings. 
Why not then use just the data on sex-disparity in labor-force participation for the purpose of 
inter-country comparisons, rather than adding this uniform assumed ratio that is unlikely to hold 
true in reality in most of  the countries? 
An examination of  the large body of  GDI exercises already done with Indian data for the 
purpose of  inter-state comparisons shows the additional problem of  differences in definition of 
labor force participation and earnings (Prabhu et ai, 1996).  For quite a few states major variations 
appears in the ranking by the gender-gap in earned incomes and by the overall GDI depending on 
the measures of  females work participation and wage rates used.  In the case of  Gujarat, for 
example, the female work participation ranges between 14% and 30% depending on whether one 
uses the census definition of  main workers of the National Sample Survey measure of  principal 
plus subsidiary workers.  The high incidence of marginal workers causes the state's [GDI or 
gender gap in earned income?] to improve from 6 to 2 when the latter is used; Maharashtra 
shows the least gender disparity in income using census data whereas with the NSS it gets the 
third rank; Tamil Nadu ranks second of  the census WPR data and the average agricultural wage 
data ofthe ministry of  agriculture are used; use of  the NSS data lowers the state's rank to 6 or 7 
depending on whether the agricultural wage rates relate to regular of  casual workers; 
correspondingly, Haryana's rank goes up from 7 to 2 or 1 (Prabhu et aI., 1996, ES-77).  Such 
relative variations in the ranking underscore a severe problem with the imprecision and variability 
of  the definitions of  labour force participation and earnings.  Reliance on published official 
statistics as done in the GDI are often based on differing definitions and caution is needed in 
interpreting these differences. 
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Apart from these problems relating to the individual components, there is a question as 
to the relative weights given to gender bias in the three components.  As mentioned in section 
2, an important factor for the dominance of  the earned income component in the gender 
penalty of  the GDI are the much larger observed sex-gaps in earned income (or in labor-force 
participation), compared to the smaller gaps in education, and the even smaller gaps in life 
expectancy.  By applying the same aversion-to-inequality factor of2 to the gaps in all three 
components, the observed gaps are penalized in accordance with the magnitudes of 
measurement unit.  Should they? 
While it is obviously very difficult to assess the relative importance of  a gender gap in 
education or longevity vis-a-vis a gender gap in earned income, some observations may be in 
order25  First, small gaps in longevity have considerable substantive importance.  If  gender 
inequality led to a drop in female life expectancy by one year, this would, in a typical 
developing country, lead to an increase in the female crude death rate by 3.9%.26  In a country 
like India, with about 20 million births a year, it would lead to an increase of female infant 
deaths of 98,000 alone, in addition to higher rates of  deaths in all other age groups.  This 
suggests that even a small gap in life expectancy has as its consequence a considerable human 
toll and it is debatable whether such a gap is of  the sarne severity as a 2/3 percentage point 
difference in earned income in a country (which would receive the same penalty in the GDI as 
a one year gap in life expectancy). 
Another way to illustrate the implications of  the equal penalties applied to all three 
components is to consider the following scenario.  The maximum penalty applied for gaps in 
earned income (applied in Qatar where females are earning only 5.3% of  total income) would, 
if  they existed in the longevity component, be applied to a country where there was a 54 year 
gap in longevity between males and females (i.e. a male life expectancy of  82 and a female 
life expectancy of33, or a female life expectancy of82 and a male life expectancy of23). 
This would mean a female death rate of  8 times that of  males (or vice versa).  It  seems 
difficult to argue that Qatar suffers from the disparity of  earnings opportunities to the extent 
25 Such an assessment would have to spell out the intrinsic and instrumental importance of  each of  those indicators. 
express them in a cardinal fonn. and then assess the impact of  certain gaps on well-being.  This is beyond the scope 
of  the present analysis. 
26 The assumptions used are: a stationary population confonning to the Model Life Tables West (Coale, Demeny, 
and Vaughan, 1983), with life expectancy of  50 years, and a popUlation growth rate of2%. 
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they would if  women had an 8-times higher mortality rate then men.  Clearly, the weight the 
earned-income component receives, compared to the other two components, especially life 
expectancy, is much higher than is justified. 
Thus the GDI is faced with three serious short-comings that make the index deeply 
problematic.  First, it ignores the impact of  past (and present pre-natal) discrimination in 
mortality by concentrating on the life expectancy measure.  Second, the overwhelming 
earned-income component is deeply problematic, both conceptually as well as in its 
estimation procedure.  And finally, the overall assessment ends up neglecting the life 
expectancy measure completely, and the education measure largely, by giving too little weight 
in the assessment of  the inequality penalty, which is contrary to the reality of large and highly 
consequential gender gaps in these two measures. 
One implication of  these is that we should discount the results arrived at by the 
problematic methods.  In particular, the concentration of  the gender penalty in the Middle East 
and North Africa, largely driven by the problematic earned income component, is 
questionable, given the importance of  large gaps in longevity and education in other parts of 
the world, most notably South Asia.  There is reason to doubt that the impact of  gender 
inequality in Saudi Arabia on human development is, in percentage terms, twelve times larger 
than in China, three times larger than in India, and four times larger than in Bangladesh. 
Several remedies to the more serious problems suggest themselves.  First, it may be 
best to drop the earned income component from the assessment due to its severe conceptual 
and practical problems27  If it is to remain, one would have to consider ways to look at some 
measure of  consumption by sex, as more relevant to well-being, rather than focus only on the 
earned income or the labor-force participation.  At the very least, attempt should be made, 
consistently with the perspective of  the HDRs, to include women's non-market work 
(including domestic/reproductive work) in laborforce participation, whose extent is usually far 
greater in poorer and less commercialized contexts. 
27 That would obviously' reduce the conceptually elegant parallels and comparisons with the HDI with uses average 
income in its assessment.  One way to still be able to compare results would be to calculate a HDI without the 
income component and then compare it to a GDI only including the longevity and education compon~nts  to see the 
impact of  gender inequality on human development in a country. 
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Secondly, the weight of  the longevity and the education components must be increased 
to insure that countries are indeed penalized for any large gap in these areas.  One simple 
procedure would be to increase the aversion-to-inequality factor applied for these two 
components, with the option of  increasing the penalty in the longevity component more than 
the education component.  28 
Thirdly, the longevity component should include a stock measure such as of 'missing 
women' in such a way that it penalizes countries for large shares of  missing women to at least 
the same extent it penalizes countries for large education disparities. 
4. The Gender Empowerment Measure 
The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) of  the UNDP is conceptually very different 
from the GD!.  Instead of  focusing on the impact of  gender inequality in human development, the 
GEM measures the extent to which women have gained economic and political power.  It  thus 
attempts to measure not their achievement in well-being, but their roles as agents in society. 
It contains three elements comparing male and female shares, the gaps adjusted by the 
'aversion to inequality' factor (implying that 50/50 shares should be the goal in all three).29 
These are: the share of  parliamentary seats;30 the share of  administrative, professional, technical, 
and managerial positions; and the share of  earned income similar to that used for the GDPl  It 
thus attempts to indicate women's participation in governmental and managerial decision-making 
and professional roles, and in economic activities generally.  This may be of importance for 
28 An easy way to increase the weight of  the life expectancy component would be to reduce the range of  possible life 
expectancies from presently 60 years to, say, 35 years (42.5 to 87.5 years for women, and 37.5 to 82.5 years for men) 
which would still then include the entire range of  observed life expectancies.  This way the same life expectancy 
gaps (of  -7 to +6 years) would be larger in percentage terms (as they are divided by the maximum possible gap), 
leading to a higher penalty for them.  Another way to deal with the weighting issue is to simply assume that the 
maximum observed gap in each component should receive the same penalty and adjust the aversion-to-inequality 
factor accordingly.  While this may also be seen as arbitrary, it would avoid the problematic results of  the unjustified 
preponderance of  one component in the index owing to massive differences in measurement of  observed gaps. 
29 The first two components are different from those in the GDI as they measure not absolute achievements (e.g. 
longevity and schooling) but gender shares which, by definition, add up to 100%.  Therefore, in the calculation of 
the GEM, there is no achievement element that is considered, only the gaps in the shares. 
30 The UNDP acknowledges a broader measure including regional and local parliaments and governments to be 
preferable, but data limitations force it to use this rather limited indicator (UNDP 1995: 82). 
31  In contrast to the GDI, the GEM uses unadjusted income which ranges from $100 to $40,000 rather than mapping 
this unadjusted income by the concave function used for both the GDI and HDI.  The justification provided is that 
the GEM measures income as an empowerment tool while the GDJ measures income as a development tool (UNDP 
1995: 82). 
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several reasons.  First, it is a measure of  economic and political opportunities open to women, 
which may be of  considerable intrinsic importance.  Secondly, it may be that women are more 
effective promoters of  their own cause.  If  that were the case (which may be debatable in some 
circumstances32), then greater economic and political power for women may be an effective way 
to reduce other gender inequalities in society.  And finally, it can be argued that a society that 
neglects the economic and political potential of  half  its population is likely to perform worse than 
a society that draws on all its best talent, regardless of  gender. 
Table 2 shows the HD!, GD!, and GEM and its components for a sample of  countries.  As 
all three components are based on a scale of 1-\ 00 and since the variance ofthe three components 
does not differ greatly, the GEM avoids some of  the problems of  the GD!.  In particular and in 
contrast to the GD!, there is no component that enjoys such overriding importance as the earned 
income component has in the GD!.  Moreover, the use of  the gender gaps in earned income to 
adj ust average income appears much less problematic conceptually here than in the GD!, as the 
GEM is designed to measure female agency (rather than overall development as the GD!) and 
economic power as measured by earned income shares is clearly an important aspect of  agency.33 
32 For example, as Sen (1990) argues, women may be the agents 'conspiring' to lower their own welfare through 
putting the welfare of  the·other family members before their own.  Besides, the impressive number of  female heads 
of  state and prime ministers in South Asia in recent decades (largely owing to relationship with politically powerful 
males) seems to have had little effect on women's empowerment at mass level. 
II  At the same time, the data issues and the assumptions made to calculate the index are the same as those mentioned 
above. 
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Table 2: GEM and its Components in Selected Countries 
Female Shares in: 
HDI  GDI  GEM  GEM-HDI GEM-GDI  National  Administrators  Prof. and Tech Earned 
Parliament and Manasers  Em(!I0l:ees  Income 
Sweden  0.929  0.919  0.757  -18.5%  -17.6%  33.5  38.9  63.3  41.6 
USA  0.937  0.901  0.623  -33.5%  -30.9%  10.3  40.2  50.8  34.6 
Cuba  0.726  0.769  0.524  -27.8%  -31.9%  22.8  18.5  47.8  27.2 
China  0.594  0.578  0.474  -20.2%  -18.0%  21.0  11.6  45.1  31.2 
Japan  0.937  0.896  0.442  -52.8%  -50.7%  6.7  8.0  42.0  33.5 
Poland  0.855  0.838  0.432  -49.5%  -48.4%  13.0  15.6  60.4  39.3 
Botswana  0.696  0.763  0.407  -41.5%  -46.7%  5.0  36.1  61.4  28.5 
Mexico  0.842  0.741  0.399  -52.6%  -46.2%  7.3  19.4  43.2  22.3 
Thailand  0.827  0.798  0.373  -54.9%  -53.3%  3.7  22.2  52.7  34.6 
Indonesia  0.637  0.591  0.362  -43.2%  -38.7%  12.2  6.6  40.8  25.3 
Brazil  0.804  0.709  0.358  -55.5%  -49.5%  5.5  17.3  57.2  22.9 
Bangladesh  0.364  0.334  0.287  -21.2%  -14.1%  10.3  5.1  23.1  22.8 
Syria  0.571  0.761  0.285  -50.1 %  -62.5%  8.4  5.6  26.4  11.3 
Algeria  0.732  0.508  0.266  -63.7%  -47.6%  6.7  5.9  27.6  7.5 
South Korea  0.78  0.882  0.255  -67.3%  -71.1 %  1.0  4.1  42.5  22.0 
Iran  0.77  0.611  0.237  -69.2%  -61.2%  3.5  3.5  32.6  14.9 
Egypt  0.613  0.453  0.237  -61.3%  -47.7%  2.2  10.4  28.3  8.2 
India  0,439  0.401  0.226  -48.5%  -43.6%  7.3  2.3  20.5  19.2 
Nigeria  0,406  0.383  0.198  -51.2%  -48.3%  2.1  5.5  26.0  28.5 
Pakistan  0,483  0.36  0.153  -68.3%  -57.5%  1.6  2.9  18.4  10.2 
Source UNDP (1995). 
While there is some correlation between the GEM and the HD! as well as between the 
GEM and the GD!, the correlation is not very close.  In Sweden, the GEM is 18% lower than 
the HD!, while in Iran it is nearly 70% lower than its HDI.  In South Korea, the GEM is 71 % 
lower than the GD!, mostly due to its minuscule female membership of  the parliament and 
small female share of  administrators and managers. 
While the GEM clearly captures some important aspects offemale agency, it is 
questionable how well the GEM measure at present fully captures economic and political power 
held by women and their roles in the development process.  Apart from the problems noted earlier 
with the earnings-gap indicator in inter-country comparison, and with the weighting and 
averaging procedures, the choice of  the other two indicators suffers from two weaknesses. 
One arises from the problem of  lack of  power of  parliaments in some of  the cases, thereby 
making it difficult to interpret the share of  female political representation. As seen in Table 2, two 
of  the countries with high shares of  female representation in parliament are China and Cuba.  In 
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both cases, parliaments have little say and the higher GEM ranking as a result of  this is therefore 
not reflecting actual political power for women.34 
The other weakness is that it focuses too much on representation at the national 
government level and in the formal sectors of  the economy.  It thus misses much of  the 
participation and involvement of  women at local political and administrative levels, in grassroots 
mobilization at the community level (whether within political parties or outside of  them), and in 
the many NGOs active in development -- in the range of  participatory and network-articulatory 
processes.  This omission is not only of  academic significance, but may also have practical 
repercussions, given the likelihood that a country's GEM ranking will catch attention 
internationally and hence generate battles internally.  A less lop-sided notion of  women's agency 
could therefore help focus policies and politics more adequately on the issues of  female 
empowerment at all levels of  development-related decisionmaking. 
For instance, in India an important political-economic process that has been gaining real 
strength in some areas is the institution a decade ago of  30% female share of  seats in village 
councils known as panchayat through seat reservation and election.  This arguably can mean 
more, not less, in terms of  women's empowerment and agency than a similar quota reservation of 
parliamentary seats as proposed by the recent constitutional amendment bilJ.35 Eventual passage 
of  this constitutional amendment to reserve parliamentary seats for women would, no doubt, 
boost India's GEM ranking as defined, and that itself would serve to propel it politically, while 
the importance of increased level of  activity of  village women in the local decision-making 
34 Under the communist regimes, Eastern European parliaments (though not the all-powerful politburos!) had 
among the highest levels of female representatives.  Since these parliaments had effectively no power, this was of 
little meaning.  The irony of  history is that as soon as parliaments took on a more powerful role in the transition, the 
share of  women in the formerly communist countries dropped sharply (Klasen, 1993b). 
35 For a realpolitik critique of  the proposed reservation of  seats in national parliament and state legislative 
assemblies in India, see Kishwar (1996), a noted feminist, activist, social scientist.  "Parties who are sincerely 
interested in seeing women take an active part in politics ought to begin by activating their women's fronts at all 
levels, and by recruiting more women at the decision-making levels in their respective parties.  So far they have 
shown no inclination or preparation to do so .... Similarly, women's organizations who have been the prime lobby 
for more seats for women in parliament, legislative assemblies, etc., have to work to ensure that women join various 
political parties in large numbers and develop their own constituencies by building alliances with other sections of 
society rather than waitillg for reservations to give them automatic entry ....  [It) is like demanding ...  the 
equivalent of  a 'zanana dabba' in every train.  Men then get very upset if  women occupy seats not reserved for them 
.... The present scheme of  reservation will ensure that women will enter the electoral battle only against other 
women ... ,a sure way to perpetually ghettoize women's politics." (op. cit., 2871-2). 
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bodies, directly accountable to the local communities, does not at all get reflected in the GEM as 
it is constituted at present. 
In various forms, women's community-level empowerment and organization are 
increasingly taking place in the development processes, generating what is widely viewed as a 
major new participatory resource of  considerable potential in a context of  gender-related 
policymaking.  Such organization of  poor and disadvantaged groups has often helped, and been 
helped by, solidaristic activism cutting across class and ethnic lines.  In the best of  the cases, it 
has helped generate the much-needed skills of  collective bargaining, insurance for economic 
survival, the means to develop human and entrepreneurial resources against poverty and 
oppression, and the networks of  participatory groups to politically demand and safeguard their 
basic needs, networks in the absence of which even well-intentioned policy from the top tends to 
founder in implementation.  These grass-roots forms of  women's emergence in varying degrees in 
developing countries, which often prove to be empowering as well as human resource augmenting 
and both the individual and social levels,  seem to be quite left out of  the UNDP's GEM as it is 
now.  Finding ways to take them into account would track more adequately the real extent of 
women's socio-political agency at the levels of  communities and nations. 
A somewhat related criticism of  the present GEM is that in assessing economic 
empowerment, it concentrates too much on income earning, ignoring even the available 
indicators of  access to work-related facilities that are of  crucial importance for the female 
working poor.  Access to institutional credit is one such thing, (including collateral-
substituting innovations to overcome women's credit-market disadvantages).  Access to 
production and marketing information is another.  Access to childcare (especially positive 
effects on not only the quality of  women's labor-force participation, but also the schooling of 
their daughters (Bardhan and Klasen, 1997)), and access to cooking fuel and potable water has 
similar feedback effects on both quality of  work and health through reduced caloric drain in 
collecting these. 
5. Conclusion 
Clearly, the 1995 HDR has succeeded in stimulating the debate on gender inequality and 
its measurement.  The introduction of  two measures to rank countries by gender inequality in 
human development and economic-political empowerment of  women has been an important 
24 element in this effort.  It is hoped that the momentum achieved in the discussion of  gender 
inequality in human development will be maintained. 
25 
However, the measures unfortunately do not adequately capture the existing gender biases 
and their impact on human development.  The GDI suffers from a range of  flaws in its design as 
well as in its practical application.  The GEM, while avoiding some of  the problems of  the GDI, 
is too narrowly focused on the formal economy and national political structures and thereby 
neglects many important facets of  (actual and potential) female empowerment at the local 
institutional levels and in the grass-roots organizational forms. 
In this paper, we have attempted to highlight the problems with the current measures and 
suggest certain steps to improve them, feasible with existing data sets and/or information not too 
hard to compile.  We believe that these measures, if  suitably adjusted, could be an important 
element in a strategy to monitor progress in the gender dimension of  human development and in 
women's economic and political empowerment. 
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